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Abstract 
Sense of agency refers to the experience of initiating and controlling actions in order to 
influence events in the outside world. A disturbed sense of agency is found in certain 
psychiatric and neurological disorders, most notably schizophrenia. Sense of agency is 
associated with a subjective compression of time: actions and their outcomes are perceived as 
bound together in time.  This is known as ‘intentional binding’ and, in healthy adults, 
depends partly on advance prediction of action outcomes. Notably, this predictive 
contribution is disrupted in patients with schizophrenia. In the present study we aimed to 
characterise the psychotomimetic effect of ketamine, a drug model for psychosis, on the 
predictive contribution to intentional binding. It was shown that ketamine produced a 
disruption that closely resembled previous data from patients in the early, prodromal, stage of 
schizophrenic illness. These results are discussed in terms of established models of delusion 
formation in schizophrenia. The link between time and agency, more generally, is also 
considered.  
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1. Introduction 
 
In humans, voluntary goal-directed action is accompanied by an experience of initiating and 
controlling the action, and through it, controlling the external world. This experience is 
referred to as the sense of agency. A disturbance in sense of agency may lie at the heart of 
psychotic symptoms such as delusions and hallucinations, which are characteristic of 
schizophrenia - a syndrome that also entails marked alterations in the perception of time. 
 
Intriguingly, this sense of agency is associated with a subjective compression of time, such 
that actions and their effects are perceived as bound together across time (Haggard, Clark, & 
Kalogeras, 2002; Moore & Obhi, 2012). This effect is known as ‘intentional binding’ (Figure 
1A). In the standard version of the intentional binding paradigm, participants judge the onset 
of either voluntary actions (a key press) or the onset of a sensory event (a tone) presented 
250ms after the action. The perceived onset of the action is shifted later in time in 
comparison to the perceived onset of actions in a baseline condition in which the action does 
not produce a tone. Furthermore, the perceived onset of the tone is shifted earlier in time 
relative to the perceived onset of tones in a baseline condition in which the tone is presented 
without action. In short, a causal action is experienced as occurring closer to the ensuing 
outcome while the experience of the outcome moves closer to its causal action. This binding 
effect is specific to voluntary action. When actions are not under voluntary control the 
reverse pattern of results is observed. It has therefore been proposed that intentional binding 
is a viable implicit measure of sense of agency (Haggard et al., 2002; Moore & Haggard, 
2010; Moore & Obhi, 2012). 
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Figure 1. A) The intentional binding effect. Voluntary actions and outcomes are temporally bound 
together in experience, whereas involuntary movements and outcomes are separated in experience 
(see Haggard et al., 2002). B) Operational definition of prediction in our study. A predictive 
contribution to action binding was derived from subtracting the shifts in the temporal experience of 
action on ‘action only’ trials in 50% effect probability condition, from shifts on action ‘only trials’ in 
the 75% effect probability condition. 
 
As noted, a disrupted sense of agency is characteristic of certain psychiatric disorders, most 
notably schizophrenia (Frith, 1992). Such would be the case, for example, in delusions of 
control, where the sufferer has a compelling sense of actions being controlled by an outside 
force. According to one influential model of sense of agency, the so-called ‘Comparator 
Model’ (CM), disordered experiences of agency in schizophrenia are produced by deficits in 
sensorimotor prediction. According to this view, the normal experience of agency is 
dependent on predictive motor control processes (Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 2002; Frith, 
2005). Specifically, an efference copy of motor commands is used to predict the likely 
sensory consequences of a voluntary action, and the comparison between these predictions 
and the actual sensory consequences informs sense of agency. A match between predicted 
and actual sensory consequences of movement promotes the feeling of self-agency, whereas a 
mismatch reduces it. According to the CM, experiences of passivity in patients with 
schizophrenia can be explained by impaired sensorimotor prediction during voluntary action. 
This impairment would lead to a faulty mismatch between the actual and expected sensory 
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consequences. As a result, patients experience a reduced feeling of self-agency for their 
movements.  
 
In support of the CM, a number of studies on sense of agency in schizophrenia have shown 
that patients have deficits in sensorimotor prediction (Blakemore, Smith, Steel, Johnstone, & 
Frith, 2000; Shergill, Samson, Bays, Frith, & Wolpert, 2005; Synofzik, Thier, Leube, 
Schlotterbeck, & Lindner, 2009). Compelling evidence also comes from studies using the 
intentional binding paradigm. Moore and Haggard (2008) confirmed the contribution of 
prediction to sense of agency in healthy volunteers. When actions frequently produced an 
outcome, the shift in perceived time of action towards the (expected tone) occurred even on 
rare ‘action only’ trials, on which the outcome was omitted. This suggests that predicting the 
outcome was sufficient to generate the shift in perceived time of action. This was confirmed 
by the reduction in binding on ‘action only’ trials in a condition where the tone was 
unpredictable. This approach to exploring the predictive component of intentional binding is 
shown in Figure 1B: The predictive contribution represents the difference in binding on 
‘action only’ trials in the 75% condition (where 75% of trials are followed by tones) vs. the 
50% condition (where 50% of the trials are followed by tones), and the more positive this 
difference the greater the predictive contribution.  
 
Using this same procedure, deficits in sensorimotor prediction have been observed in patients 
with schizophrenia and in prodromal patients. However, the pattern of predictive deficits in 
these two groups is quite different (see Figure 2). Patients with schizophrenia show an 
absence of predictive action binding (Voss et al., 2010), in direct support of the CM. On the 
other hand, prodromal patients, those who experience symptoms pointing towards a psychotic 
disorder but who do not yet meet diagnostic criteria, show much stronger predictive action 
binding relative to controls (Hauser et al., 2011).  
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Figure 2.  Data from previous studies on patients with schizophrenia and patients in the psychotic 
prodrome. These data represent the predictive contribution to action binding (i.e. the difference in 
binding on ‘action only’ trials in the 75% vs. 50% condition. The greater this difference the stronger 
the predictive contribution). Both studies replicated the predictive contribution to binding in healthy 
volunteers found by Moore & Haggard (2008). However, the two groups of patients showed different 
deficits on this task. Patients with schizophrenia showed no significant predictive contribution (from 
Voss et al., 2010), whereas prodromal patients showed an excessive predictive contribution (from 
Hauser et al., 2011).   
 
 
In summary, the subjective perception of the timing of both a causal action and its ensuing 
outcome offers an implicit measure of SoA. Moreover, it is possible to develop this measure 
in order to determine the extent to which that sense emerges from a predictive relationship 
between an action and its consequences. This has been further refined to offer a novel way to 
explore the relationship between prediction, agency and timing in schizophrenia and the 
emerging results suggest that while, overall, disturbances in schizophrenia are compatible 
with disrupted SoA (as measured by altered experience of the temporal relationship between 
actions and outcomes), the precise nature of the disruption depends on the stage of illness and 
this interacts with the degree to which the action is more or less predictive of the outcome. In 
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the current study, we sought to explore this further using a psychopharmacological study of 
the effects of ketamine - a drug model of early schizophrenia – on intentional binding. 
 
Ketamine is a non-competitive NMDA receptor antagonist, which, at sub-anaesthetic levels, 
produces a state in healthy adults that resembles the perceptual disturbances of schizophrenia 
in several key ways. For example, it induces perceptual changes, ideas of reference, thought 
disorder and some negative symptoms (Ghoneim, Hinrichs, Mewaldt, & Petersen, 1985; 
Lahti, Weiler, Tamara Michaelidis, Parwani, & Tamminga, 2001; Mason, Morgan, 
Stefanovic, & Curran, 2008; Morgan, Mofeez, Brandner, Bromley, & Curran, 2004; Pomarol-
Clotet et al., 2006). Importantly, ketamine also reproduces aberrant experiences of agency 
associated with schizophrenia. In a previous study using the IB paradigm it was found that 
the magnitude of binding in patients with schizophrenia was significantly stronger than 
controls (Haggard, Martin, Taylor-Clarke, Jeannerod, & Franck, 2003; Voss et al., 2010), an 
effect reproduced by administration of ketamine in healthy controls, where the magnitude of 
binding on ketamine was significantly stronger than binding in the same participants on 
placebo (Moore et al., 2011). Given the known neurobiological effects of ketamine, the drug 
model also provides a window onto the neurobiological basis of these aberrant experiences of 
agency.  
 
A key issue concerning the ketamine model of psychosis concerns the stage of the disease the 
drug most closely resembles. Looking at the overall binding effect is unlikely to resolve this 
issue as augmented overall binding is associated with both established schizophrenic illness 
(Haggard et al., 2003; Voss et al., 2010) and the psychotic prodrome (Hauser et al., 2011). 
However, the aforementioned pattern of contrasting predictive impairments at different stages 
of the disease provides an ideal opportunity for testing this in the context of aberrant 
experiences of agency.  
 
We replicated the design of the previous patient studies (Voss et al., 2010; Hauser et al., 
2011) to determine the effect of ketamine on predictive action binding. If the effects of acute 
ketamine administration are most redolent of the established schizophrenic illness, then we 
would expect ketamine to reduce the predictive contribution to action binding relative to 
placebo. Conversely, if the effects are most redolent of the prodromal stage of the disease 
then we would expect there to be a significant increase in predictive action binding on 
ketamine relative to placebo.  
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We also explored the link between these putative cognitive effects of the ketamine challenge 
and the changes in subjective experience also arising from it. In particular we were interested 
in the relation between binding and changes in the experience of body perception, as 
measured by the Clinician-Administered Dissociative States Scale (CADSS; Bremner et al., 
1998). In a previous study we found that the magnitude of the binding effect on ketamine was 
positively correlated with the degree of changes in body perception produced by the drug 
(Moore et al., 2011). In the present study we sought to replicate this effect.  
 
2. Methods 
 
2.1 Participants 
14 participants were initially recruited to the study. Of these, 12 participants completed both 
ketamine and placebo sessions (8 females; mean age 23 years). The study was approved by 
Addenbrookes NHS Trust Research Ethics Committee. Participants provided written, 
informed consent. 
 
2.2 Experimental design 
The study used a double-blind, placebo-controlled, randomised, within-subjects design.  
 
2.3 Infusion protocol 
Participants were administered placebo (saline) or racemic ketamine (2 mg/mL) as an 
intravenous infusion using a target-controlled infusion system comprising a computer which 
implemented Stanpump software (S Shafer; http://www.opentci.org/doku.php?id=code:code) 
to control a syringe driver infusion pump (Graseby 3500; Graseby Medical Ltd, Watford, 
United Kingdom). Stanpump was programmed to use a 2-compartmental pharmacokinetic 
model (Rigby-Jones et al.), to implement a complex infusion profile designed to achieve pre-
specified plasma ketamine concentrations.   
 
During the drug session, participants received first low-dose ketamine (plasma target 
100ng/mL) and then higher dose (plasma target 200ng/mL). The intentional binding task was 
completed at the low dose (other cognitive tasks were completed at the higher dose). We 
decided to run the task at the lower dose as we were mindful of the generic impairments in 
9 
 
cognition and attention that may be produced by ketamine, and which may therefore have an 
impact on task performance.  
 
Drug and placebo sessions were separated by at least one week. Participants also underwent a 
clinical assessment (see below). The order of drug and placebo visits was counterbalanced 
across all 12 participants (i.e. 6 participants completed the ketamine session first).   
 
2.4 Intentional binding task  
 
The basic trial structure is shown in Figure 3. Participants watched a computer screen on 
which a hand rotated around a clock-face (marked at conventional “5-minute” intervals). 
Each full rotation lasted 2560ms. There were two agency conditions: 50% outcome 
probability and 75% outcome probability. In these conditions, participants pressed a key with 
their right index finger at a time of their choosing. In the 50% outcome probability condition 
this key press caused a tone on 50% of the trials. In the 75% outcome probability condition 
this key press caused a tone on 75% of the trials. When the tone was played it was done so 
after a delay for 250ms. The clock-hand then continued rotating for a random period of time 
(between 1500ms and 2500ms). When it stopped participants verbally reported the time of 
their key press. These judgements were blocked, so participants only made a single type of 
estimate on each trial in each block. To make the time estimates, participants reported the 
position of the hand on the clock face when they pressed the key. These two agency 
conditions consisted of 32 trials each. 
 
They completed a further 32-trial baseline block of time estimates (baseline action). In this 
block, participants pressed the key at a time of their choosing. However, the key press never 
produced a tone, and on each trial participants reported the time of the key press. These 
baseline blocks control for individual differences in the time perception of actions. They also 
allow us to determine, and control for, systematic differences in the temporal experience of 
these events resulting from the drug. The order of these three blocks (2 x agency, and 1 x 
baseline) was randomised for each participant. 
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2.5 Data analysis: Overall action binding and predictive action binding 
 
To calculate overall action binding, average judgment error (difference between the estimated 
and actual onset of action) in the baseline condition was subtracted from average judgement 
error across both outcome probability conditions, irrespective of trial type (50% and 75% 
conditions, ‘action only’ and ‘action + tone’ trials). The more positive the difference between 
these two average judgement errors the more the perceived time of action was bound towards 
the (putative) outcome. Following Moore et al. (2011) we predicted more overall action 
binding on ketamine relative to placebo.  
 
The predictive contribution to action binding was calculated in the same way as previously 
described by Voss et al (2010) and Hauser et al (2011) (see Figure 1B for schematic). We 
first calculated action binding in each outcome probability condition for both ‘action only’ 
and ‘action + tone’ trials. For this we subtracted the mean action judgement error in the 
baseline action condition from the mean action judgement error for each trial type in each 
condition. A positive value represents binding of the action towards the (putative) tone. To 
calculate the contribution of outcome prediction to action binding we simply subtracted the 
action binding score on ‘action only’ trials in the 50% outcome probability condition from the 
action binding score on those same trials in the 75% outcome probability condition. The 
resulting difference represents the contribution of outcome prediction to action binding: The 
more positive the difference the stronger that contribution.  
 
Moore and Haggard (2008) have also demonstrated a postdictive contribution to action 
binding. This is shown by an increase in the magnitude of action binding on ‘action + tone’ 
trials vs. ‘action only’ trials in the 50% condition (where outcome prediction is minimal). 
Although we also present these data from ketamine and placebo sessions for illustrative 
purposes, our analyses focus only on differences in prediction. This is because deficits in 
prediction have been widely implicated in schizophrenia (postdiction less so) and because 
only differences in the magnitude of predictive influences on action binding clearly 
distinguish between the different stages of schizophrenic illness.  
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Figure 3 Trial structure in the agency condition (following Moore & Haggard, 2008; Voss et al., 
2010; Hauser et al., in press). Participants pressed the key at a time of their choosing. In one condition 
the key pressed cause the tone on 50% of trials. In another condition, the key press caused the tone on 
75% of trials. If the tone was played it was done after a delay of 250ms from key press. Participants 
judged where the clock hand was when they pressed the key. 
 
 
2.6 Clinical assessment 
 
The Clinician-Administered Dissociative States Scale (CADSS; Bremner et al., 1998) was 
administered at both 100ng/mL and 200ng/mL. Intentional binding was run on the lower dose 
of 100ng/mL (other cognitive tasks were run at the higher dose). This consists of 5 subscales: 
body perception, environmental perception, feelings of unreality, memory impairment, and 
time perception. Each subscale consists of items (questions), and participants’ responses are 
coded on a 5-point scale (0: “Not at all” through to 4: “Extremely”).  
 
We focussed our analyses the ‘Body Perception’ subscale for the CADSS administered at 
100ng/mL (the infusion level at which the binding task was completed). This includes the 
questions: “Do you feel disconnected from your own body?” and “Does your sense of your 
own body feel changed: for instance, does your own body feel unusually large or unusually 
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small?” We predicted a positive correlation between overall action binding and scores on the 
body perception scale (following, Moore et al., 2011).We also conducted further exploratory 
correlation analyses between other variables.  
  
3. Results 
 
Table 1 shows mean action binding effects and also postdictive and predictive action binding 
for each drug session.  
 
Table 1. Mean binding effects (ms) for each drug session (SD across subjects in parentheses). 
Postdictive action binding is calculated by subtracting binding on ‘action only’ trials from binding on 
‘action + tone’ trials in the 50% condition. The more positive this difference the stronger the 
postdictive effect. Predictive binding, the focus of this study, is calculated by subtracting binding on 
‘action only’ trials in the 50% condition from binding on the same trials in the 75% condition. The 
more positive this difference the stronger the predictive effect. 
 
Drug session Condition Trial type Action 
binding 
(ms) (SD) 
Postdictive 
action binding 
(ms) (SD) 
Predictive 
action binding 
(ms) (SD) 
Placebo 50% Action only -2.0 (30)   
  Action + tone 6.0 (30) 8.0 (27)  
 75% Action only -14.0 (42)  -12.0 (48) 
  Action + tone 2.0 (30)   
Ketamine 50% Action only 1.0 (31)   
  Action + tone -4.0 (33) -5.0 (31)  
 75% Action only 25.0 (21)  24.0 (38) 
  Action + tone 34.5 (22)   
 
 
3.1 Overall action binding and predictive action binding 
 
We found that ketamine significantly increased the overall level of action binding (i.e. action 
binding averaged across trials and conditions), t(11) = 1.83, p = .048 (1-tailed). This 
replicates a previous finding (Moore et al., 2011). This increased action binding has also been 
observed in patients with schizophrenia (Voss et al., 2010). 
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Of principle interest was the effect of ketamine on predictive action binding. A paired-
samples t-test on predictive binding scores showed a significant difference between placebo 
and ketamine, t(11) = 2.37, p = .04 (2-tailed). Inspection of Figure 4 and Table 1 shows that 
ketamine engendered a significant increase in the predictive contribution to binding. This 
shows that ketamine selectively increased the magnitude of binding on ‘action only’ trials in 
the 75% condition vs. the 50% condition. This pattern of results resembles previous data in 
prodromal patients from Hauser et al., (2011). Furthermore, the magnitude of this predictive 
contribution to binding on ketamine (24ms) was similar to that observed previously in 
prodromal patients (27ms; Hauser et al., 2011) 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Prediction-dependent shifts in action binding (ms) on placebo and ketamine. These shifts 
are calculated by subtracting binding on ‘action only’ trials in the 50% condition from binding on the 
same trials in the 75% condition. The more positive this difference the stronger the predictive effect.  
Error bars represent standard error of the mean.  
 
3.2 Correlations between binding and CADSS scores  
 
We also assessed the strength of correlation between these binding measures on ketamine and 
scores on the CADSS. A priori we expected a significant positive correlation between overall 
action binding on ketamine and scores on the ‘Body Perception’ sub-category of the CADSS 
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(following Moore et al., 2011). We also present any significant correlations following further 
exploratory analysis of different variables.  
 
Overall action binding showed near-significant correlations with body perception scores (rho 
= .47, p = .06; 1-tailed). Although not quite significant, the positive correlation between 
overall action binding and body perception scores is consistent with our results from a 
previous study (see Moore et al., 2011).  Predictive action binding was not significantly 
correlated with body perception scores (rho = -.41, p = .19; 2-tailed).  
 
Here we briefly present the results of further exploratory analyses (all 2-tailed). There was a 
significant positive correlation between overall action binding on ketamine and overall 
CADSS score (rho = .61, p = .035) and also ‘Unreality’ (rho = .59, p = .044). There were no 
other significant correlations. There was, however, a near-significant correlation between 
overall action binding on ketamine and ‘Memory’ (rho = .57, p =.05) and also a near-
significant negative correlation between predictive action binding on ketamine and ‘Memory’ 
(rho = -.55, p = .06). 
 
3.3 Control analyses 
 
We also performed several control analyses. In a first analysis we compared the mean 
standard deviation of time estimates across all trials on ketamine vs. placebo. High standard 
deviations reflect high variability in time estimates, indicating possible difficulty with the 
intentional binding task (Moore et al., 2010). We predicted that ketamine would increase the 
variability in time estimates, so we used a 1-tailed test of significance. This analysis showed a 
significant difference in the mean standard deviation on ketamine (mean: 86.09ms) vs. 
placebo (mean: 66.91ms), t(11) = 1.96, p = .04. Although this suggests that ketamine caused 
more difficulty with the task we do not think that this can explain the pattern of results with 
respect to differences in prediction on ketamine vs. placebo. In particular, it is not clear how 
an increase in variability would lead to an increased sensitivity to the probability 
manipulation and a concomitant increase in binding on ‘action only’ trials in the high 
outcome probability condition. If there was a general effect of the drug on timing, we would 
have expected a significant increase in binding on both trial types.  
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In a second control analysis we considered the effect of drug session order (i.e. placebo 
session first vs. ketamine session first). It may be that the significant increase in predictive 
binding on ketamine was driven by a certain order of testing. We compared predictive 
binding on ketamine vs. placebo (‘Drug’ factor), introducing ‘Drug session order’ as a 
between subjects factor. As expected, there was a significant main effect of ‘Drug’, F(1,10) = 
5.18, p = .046. Crucially, there was no significant interaction between ‘Drug’ and ‘Drug 
session order’, F(1,10) = .18, p = .68. This suggests that drug order was not responsible for 
the effects observed in this study.  
 
In a final control analysis we considered the effect of block order (i.e. 50% condition first vs. 
75% condition first). It may be that the significant increase in predictive binding on ketamine 
was driven by a certain order of testing. For each drug session we compared the magnitude of 
predictive action binding as a function of block order. There was no significant difference in 
the magnitude of this effect as function of block order on ketamine (t(10) = .96, p =.36) or 
placebo (t(10) = .48, p =.64) (2-tailed).  This suggests that block order was not responsible 
for the effects observed in this study.  
 
4. Discussion 
 
Sense of agency is associated with systematic changes in the subjective experience of time 
(Haggard et al., 2002; Moore & Haggard, 2010; Moore & Obhi, 2012), an effect known as 
‘intentional binding’. We investigated the impact of ketamine, an important drug model for 
schizophrenia, on the action component of this effect. In replication of a previous result 
(Moore et al., 2011), it was found that ketamine significantly increased the magnitude of 
overall action binding. Moreover, the drug significantly increased the predictive contribution 
to action binding, an effect which closely resembles the performance of patients with 
prodromal symptoms of schizophrenia, reported in a previous study (Hauser et al., 2011).  
Critically, too, we demonstrated significant relationships between the effects of ketamine on 
this behavioural binding effect and the psychotomimetic effects of the drug.  
 
4.1 Hyper-binding and hyper-prediction: a common role of prediction error? 
 
The increase in overall action binding on ketamine relative to placebo replicates a previous 
finding (Moore et al., 2011). Importantly, the magnitude of binding in patients with 
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schizophrenia is similarly increased relative to controls (Haggard et al., 2003; Voss et al., 
2011). This increase in binding therefore appears to be a robust cognitive aspect of psychotic 
illness, and one that ketamine is able to reproduce reliably.   
 
Of central interest in the present study was the effect of ketamine on predictive action 
binding. In healthy adults, a strong expectation that an action will produce an outcome is 
sufficient to generate action binding (Moore & Haggard, 2008; Moore, Lagnado, Deal, & 
Haggard, 2009). Compared to controls, predictive action binding is reduced in patients with 
schizophrenia (Voss et al., 2010), whereas it is increased in prodromal patients (Hauser et al., 
2011).  In the present study we found that ketamine significantly increased the magnitude of 
predictive action binding, an effect that is most redolent of the prodromal stage of the illness.  
 
We have previously suggested that the overall increase in binding may be linked to 
inappropriate prediction error signalling (Moore et al., 2011). Prediction error refers to the 
mismatch between expectation and occurrence, and is used as a teaching signal to drive 
causal associations between events (Dickinson, 2001). Aberrant or inappropriately persistent 
error signalling is observed in patients with schizophrenia (Corlett et al., 2007; Murray et al., 
2008; Schlagenhauf et al., 2009; Fletcher & Frith, 2009) and also following ketamine 
administration in healthy volunteers (Corlett, Honey, & Fletcher, 2007; Corlett et al., 2006; 
Corlett, Honey, Krystal, & Fletcher, 2010). Since error is a signal to strengthen causal 
associations, persistent signalling of error in schizophrenia and following ketamine 
administration would be expected to inappropriately strength action-outcome association, 
resulting in the observed hyper-binding. One further possibility is that the hyper-prediction 
found in the present study (and in prodromal patients) is a consequence of hyper-binding, 
with strong action-outcome associations forming the basis of future outcome predictions. We 
are cautious however, in this speculation, given that the known impact of ketamine on 
prediction error signalling could also produce the opposite effect, rendering the 
experimentally manipulated contingencies less clear in the drug-treated state. It is also worth 
noting that certain studies encourage the opposite prediction. That is, prediction error could 
reduce the strength of action-outcome associations (e.g. Elsner & Hommel, 2004), which 
would reduce the strength of prediction. Moreover, some studies on intentional binding itself 
have shown that (temporal) unpredictability reduces the binding effect (Haggard et al., 2002). 
Future investigations should directly consider the effect of prediction error on intentional 
binding, given the current uncertainty.     
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4.2 Correlations between binding and CADSS 
 
Our correlation analyses suggest that the effects of ketamine on intentional binding are 
closely related to the psychotomimetic effects of the drug. Although not quite significant, the 
positive correlation between overall action binding on ketamine and scores on the ‘Body 
Perception’ subscale is consistent with a previous result (Moore et al., 2011). Taken together 
these results imply a close connection between the sense of agency and the experience of 
one’s own body (the ‘sense of ownership’). That agency and ownership are so entwined has 
been recognised in previous philosophical (Gallagher, 2000; Tsakiris, Schütz-Bosbach, & 
Gallagher, 2007) and psychological (Tsakiris, Prabhu, & Haggard, 2006) investigations. The 
results of the current study also suggest that disturbances in this agency-ownership 
relationship may be a core feature of psychotic illness. 
 
4.3 Sense of Time and Sense of Agency: common neurochemical bases? 
The well-established relationship between intentional binding and sense of agency suggests 
an intimate link between our experience of the temporal characteristics of our actions and our 
sense that we are the authors of these actions. While the precise nature of this relationship is 
unclear, it is noteworthy that schizophrenia, which, as we have described, is associated with 
profound alterations in sense of agency, also entails an impairment in temporal estimation 
(e.g. Rammsayer, 1990). This supports the proposed relationship between subjective timing 
and agency, an observation consistent with the fact that key neurotransmitters thought to be 
disrupted in schizophrenia (dopamine and glutamate) are also implicated in timing (Meck, 
1996) and SoA (Moore et al., 2010; Moore et al., 2011). Furthermore, we have recently 
shown that acute administration of ketamine, which can distort the experience of time in 
healthy volunteers (Pomarol-Clotet et al, 2006), produces selective deficits in a task 
evaluating the ability to compare successive temporal durations (Coull et al., 2011). This 
suggestion is further supported by the fact that regions thought to underpin sense of agency, 
such as the supplementary motor cortices and basal ganglia, also underpin time perception. 
 
Given this evidence for a link between sense of agency and the subjective timing of 
internally-generated and externally experienced events, we should consider the possibility 
that the effects of ketamine in the current study simply be related to a generic perturbation of 
the ability to make temporal estimations, either through direct effects on timing mechanisms 
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or indirectly through effects on attention. We do not believe that this is so, given that action 
time was normalised to a baseline time estimate. Were the deficit to be non-specific it is 
unlikely that it would affect one condition and not the other. Furthermore, the effect of 
ketamine was selective, producing a significant increase in binding on ‘action only’ trials in 
the 75% vs. 50% conditions. Finally, previous studies using even higher doses of ketamine 
suggest that participants are able to perform attention and working memory tasks without 
difficulty (Honey et al., 2004; Honey et al., 2003). In this way, a general effect on attention 
and/or timing is unlikely to explain our results.  
 
Finally, an outstanding issue concerning intentional binding is whether the sense of agency is 
a cause or a consequence of the subjective compression of time between actions and their 
effects. More experimental work is needed to clarify this relationship. However, an intriguing 
hypothesis (Stetson, Cui, Montague, & Eagleman, 2006) is that sense of agency is the cause 
(rather than the consequence). According to this view, we expect that outcomes caused by our 
own actions are temporally contiguous. Once we recognise that an outcome is contingent on 
our own behaviour (i.e. we have a sense of agency for it), then a recalibration mechanism is 
engaged, bringing these two events closer together in subjective time. In this way, the sense 
of agency triggers a temporal contiguity prior that pulls actions and outcomes together in 
subjective time. This suggests that perception of time, as with other perceptions, may be 
strongly modulated by prior expectancy. In this respect, the current findings might run 
counter to our previous suggestion (Corlett, Frith & Fletcher, 2009; Corlett et al., 2010) that 
ketamine’s effects in part arise from a weakening of feedback modulation and hence an 
attenuated impact of prior expectations on current input. 
 
4.4 Limitations of the study 
 
Certain limitations of the study must be acknowledged. On placebo we failed to find a 
significant predictive contribution to action binding. This limitation is perhaps explained by 
the within-subjects design: given that each participant experienced action-outcome pairings at 
varying contingencies, then it is possible that predictions were less strong than they would 
otherwise have been. Furthermore, our experimental procedure was necessarily shorter than 
previous binding studies owing to time constraints inherent in drug studies. As described 
above, one effect of ketamine may be to artificially augment the magnitude of PE signals. 
This would mean that the rate of learning is faster on ketamine compared with placebo. Given 
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this, one would expect the magnitude of binding, and the influence of prediction, on placebo 
to be attenuated in this shortened version of the task. This is precisely what we observed.   
Finally, the magnitude of the predictive contribution to action binding on ketamine (24ms) 
was of a very similar magnitude to prodromal patients (27ms; Hauser et al., 2011). This 
shows that ketamine produces a strikingly similar predictive abnormality.  
 
The limitations of the ketamine drug model of schizophrenia should also be acknowledged. 
For example, whilst ketamine produces a range of symptoms associated with endogenous 
psychosis (arguably a broader range than other drug models of the disease; Krystal et al., 
1994) there are notable exceptions (Fletcher & Honey, 2006). Furthermore, ketamine 
produces changes that are not necessarily associated with schizophrenia, such as euphoria 
(Fletcher & Honey, 2006). Indeed, we would argue that ketamine actually presents a very 
limited model of established schizophrenia, rather more compellingly reproducing the 
early/prodromal symptoms, a suggestion in keeping with the current findings. Despite these 
limitations of the ketamine drug model, we do not think they significantly undermine our 
interpretation of the present data. We have shown, once again, that ketamine boosts overall 
action binding, replicating the findings of a previous study (Moore et al., 2011).  This effect 
is also consistently observed in patients (Haggard et al., 2003; Voss et al., 2010). 
Furthermore, the pattern of predictive action binding in healthy volunteers on ketamine is 
entirely consistent with that found prodromal patients.  
 
In this paper we have emphasised the importance of sensorimotor prediction for binding and 
the sense of agency. However, it should be noted that information from various sources is 
likely to be involved (Moore, Wegner, & Haggard, 2009; Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Newen, 
2008; Wegner & Sparrow, 2004). For example, Daniel Wegner and colleagues have shown 
that the experience of agency can be established even in the absence of movement (Moore, 
Wegner, et al., 2009; Wegner, Sparrow, & Winerman, 2004). In light of this, it has been 
suggested that processes involving sensorimotor prediction are unable to fully explain the 
sense of agency. Instead, they may be limited to lower level, implicit aspects of this 
experience, which is what intentional binding may be closer to.  
 
Related to this, there is an ongoing debate concerning the neurocognitive origins of 
intentional binding. For example, some have emphasised the importance of sensorimotor 
prediction (Haggard et al., 2002; Moore & Haggard, 2008), whereas others have suggested 
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that intentional binding depends on more general predictive processes (e.g. Desantis, Hughes 
& Waszak, 2012). We would suggest that both low level sensorimotor prediction and higher 
level conscious expectation are likely to be important and that their relative influence will be 
shaped by factors such as context and cue reliability. This would be consistent with recent 
optimal cue integration approaches which recognise the importance of various sources of 
information for intentional binding and sense of agency (Moore & Fletcher, 2012). 
 
Finally, it has been suggested that intentional binding is related to causality more generally 
rather than agency specifically. However, there is little evidence to directly support this. 
Some studies have shown that causality is a necessary condition for intentional binding (e.g. 
(Buehner & Humphreys, 2009; Moore, Lagnado, Deal, & Haggard, 2009) . However, no 
studies have, to our knowledge, shown that it is sufficient (see Moore & Obhi, 2012, for 
discussion). Another possible source of evidence comes from studies showing that binding 
can occur in the absence of voluntary action (e.g. Dogge et al., 2012; Moore, Wegner & 
Haggard, 2009). However, these effects depend upon implied self-causation or the 
modification intentional content prior to the movement, both of which are highly relevant to 
agency, rather than causality more generally.  
 
4.6 Conclusion 
 
Despite the aforementioned caveats, the present study provides strong evidence that ketamine 
may best reproduce a state resembling the psychotic prodrome, rather than established 
schizophrenic illness. Using a measure of agency based on the subject experience of time we 
found that ketamine engendered excessively strong sensorimotor predictions. This closely 
resembles previous data from prodromal patients. Given the concordance between the effects 
of ketamine and prodromal patients, we suggest that this further supports the use of ketamine 
as a tool to explore the genesis of psychotic illness.  
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